PART I

STUDYING GLOBAL DISCRIMINATION

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Discrimination in an Unequal World

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Over the past decade, the challenge of inequality has become central to the discussion of the costs and benefits of globalization. Most readers of the relevant media know that the world is an extremely unequal place and that globalization might just be making it more so, even if it appears to reduce some levels of poverty.

Defenders of globalization tend not to deny this trend.[1] Yet they also assert that globalization brings about a freeing of human potential and the elimination of traditional barriers. The argument is the classic one from both classic economics and liberal ideology: in a competitive world, no one can afford to discriminate except on the basis of skills. As used to be said about Atlanta, the world is too busy making money to hate (or it was until 2008). This claim does make logical sense and is supported by some historical readings. Certainly the battle for civil rights in the American South was abetted by the process of industrialization as well as the migration to the North. Progress in gender equity has often accompanied moments of labor shortage when skills are too valuable for traditional prejudice to stand in the way of women's movement into male-dominated occupations. The "city air" of capitalism does make those fleeing the countryside freer.

Opponents of globalization counter these claims by pointing out that the new emphasis on human resources only serves to mask prior inequities by rewarding education and skills only the already wealthy could attain. From this perspective, globalization does nothing but provide a meritocratic patina on a consistently unequal distribution of opportunity. This stance is also reasonable given that many measures of global inequality have increased over the past 20 years.

Despite the often deafening volume of the debate, surprisingly little empirical work is available on the extent to which the process of globalization over the past quarter century has had any effect on discrimination as opposed to general inequality. There are quite a few journalistic anecdotes

celebrating the rise of members of low castes, women, or non-Europeans in corporate hierarchies and in the global market in general. It is true that even a single one of these cases would have been unimaginable a few decades ago. Globalization has changed many things, and for the better. It has provided unforeseeable opportunities. The question is how and how much. That is the central question behind the chapters of this book.

We need to begin by making a critical distinction between inequality and discrimination—one that is too often forgotten in the salient debates. Inequality is a static measure of a condition. It involves a disparity with respect to resources. When it involves actions, it has to do with inequity in what the *Oxford English Dictionary* parsimoniously calls "dignity, rank, or circumstance." In and of itself, few would argue for the elimination of all forms of inequality; it would appear that practically all forms of social life involve some form of hierarchy. The argument is about how unequal a society may be and how and where the inequity originates.

Condemnations of inequality come in two forms. Some assert that a distribution of resources may be so skewed as to challenge any notion of fairness. Others focus more on whether this unequal distribution was created by what the OED calls "unequal treatment of others; unfair dealing, unfairness, partiality." The former quality involves both an empirical measure and a philosophical judgment—how much does anyone deserve? The latter is less open to ethical debates: has someone been treated differently from others?

This last question is the aspect of inequality that has to do with discrimination. Note that not all discrimination may be bad. In a somewhat anachronistic sense of the term, it can mean establishing differences on the basis of some criteria, not too dissimilar from the Bourdieuan concept of distinction. In the more common or modern usage, it involves the act of noting some characteristic of an individual and then using it as a guide for behavior with that person. Even here, there is room for ethical wiggling. Elite universities apply distinctions by discriminating in favor of some intellectual talent. But to what extent are these distinctions really based on a discrimination against racial or class backgrounds? Almost universally, humans distinguish between the beautiful and the ugly (indeed, this may be the most powerful form of distinction and discrimination). Is such favoritism or bias more legitimate if based on some form of genetic signal? What if patterns of valued facial features parallel historical domination by particular groups with the preferred phenotypes?

The selection of categories on which to focus the analysis of discrimination is somewhat arbitrary. As social observers, we identify forms of discrimination and order them into a hierarchy of unjustifiable inequities. For example, despite some recent work, discrimination against the obese or the

scarred does not warrant the same attention as that against those who have darker skin. The privileging of the intelligent or the charming usually does not take into account prior injustices that may have led to inherited advantages (although as medicine progresses, the link between income and chromosomes will become a much more debated topic). Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the legitimation of discrimination is what we may call the issue of prejudice familiarity; distinctions will be considered less legitimate if they make no intuitive sense to the observer. In short, we are biased about our biases. Thus, hatred of *burakus* in Japan can seem absurd to those who cannot tell the difference between them and other Japanese, hatred between Protestant and Catholic or Shia and Sunni may puzzle those unfamiliar with the respective theological and historical knowledge, and individuals who fail to understand how caste could ever make a difference may still be able to make fine distinctions by hair texture and skin color.

Is there a logic in the manner in which we regard some discriminations as pernicious and others that we ignore? Yes. Some forms of discrimination appear universal (e.g., against those with some indication of physical or mental handicap) and we tend to largely disregard these or consider them unavoidable. Our collective critiques tend to focus on those distinctions that are geographically or socially isolated or relatively rare, are somehow "foreign," or against which it has become progressively easier to rail. So, for example, the opposition to South African apartheid increased as de jure racial segregation declined in the rest of the developed world. The biases of the non-Western societies are habitually scolded as being irrational, harmful, and ingrained, while those of the more "modern" are either natural or even functional: "They are biased; we are selective."

We also focus attention on those differences that are most closely linked to historical patterns of domination, as opposed to those that might appear "natural." We can easily trace the imperial path toward discrimination by skin color. The creation of a caste system (despite the historical mists into which it seems to recede) is obviously a product of some process of conquest. The millennia-old burden of gender is clearly linked to subordination within the family and the workplace that varies by levels of economic development. These forms of discrimination fascinate in part because they can be easily measured, but also because they tend to be supported by elaborate institutions, norms, and rituals.

To what extent has globalization destabilized these? And where do they persist? Have some traditional forms of discrimination endured while others have gone by the wayside? Have new forms of illegitimate distinctions reared their heads?

The greatest difficulty in the comparative study of discrimination, and in particular in determining policies to combat it, is defining and locating what

we may call the moment of agency or when it actually occurs. In the simplest situations, such discrimination is part of the law as was most explicitly established in apartheid South Africa. In de jure more open societies, one may still find "smoking memos" where institutions explicitly discuss creating barriers for individuals with a certain identity (as was the case, for example, with "Jewish quotas" in Ivy League schools until the 1960s). There are always the individual instances of gatekeepers making clear their wish to exclude. But the study of discrimination cannot rely on finding such evidence in every single suspected case.

There remains the difficulty of assigning intention. Do we need to prove that at particular gates the keepers are consciously practicing discrimination? To do so would be to equate individual aspirations or beliefs with social facts. To cite one obvious example, an overrepresentation of black male drivers being stopped by the police on the road does not necessarily imply that the majority of police personnel are racist, but it does indicate that there is a systemic discrimination against such persons compared to others who have chosen to take a leisurely Sunday drive. From the point of view of the young African American continually stopped, however, it matters little how the process of tagging him might work. Moreover, even those who might express discriminatory beliefs will often do so in language that either proclaims benign intent ("They wouldn't fit in") or is hidden behind a patina of meritocracy ("They just can't do the job").

These issues bring out the sometimes uncomfortable and complex relationship between inequality as a condition, inequality as a history, and discrimination as a practice. In the simplest cases we can link current inequalities to similar historical asymmetries supported by discriminatory practices. Thus we may find group X is vastly underrepresented in the top percentiles of a measure (income, education, power), has always been near the bottom on these scales, and has consistently suffered from restricted access due to discrimination against individuals who possesses the qualities used to identify them as members of group X. The long and tragic history of the Roma fits this pattern.

A somewhat more complex situation arises when the current inequality exists due to historical exclusion, but is no longer accompanied by overt discrimination (or at least the level of discrimination observed would not in and of itself account for the level of inequality). This is arguably the situation for women and racial minorities in many countries in which the struggles for civil and human rights have created legal and cultural safeguards against discrimination, if not necessarily eliminated it. In most cases, the underrepresentation of the group previously discriminated against is expected to decline as the biographical consequences of historical practices move down the demographic curve. So the numbers of women in the

business hierarchy slowly crawl up across the years. In yet another variant, discrimination persists, but is blamed on some distant past injustice, the consequences of which appear to be too difficult to fight: "We would like to hire more, but the pipeline is empty." This process can turn into an eternal wait for the historical shift in the provision of equal merits. Sadly, this seems the case with African Americans in the American professoriate.

In order to address this type of concern, a reverse form of discrimination or distinction has been instituted in some cases in order to attempt to address the historical legacies of exclusion. This, in turn, is often viewed as discriminatory by those with the previously advantaged identity. While some of these arguments appear to be no more than pining for an earlier era of domination, in other cases the complaints are harder to dismiss. So, for example, poorer members of the previously advantaged group may reasonably resent policies that provide special opportunities for those of the previously stigmatized population, regardless of their current class position. The politically charged debate in the United States on university admissions criteria is a perfect example. (But note how choices are made about which discrimination is "worse": more lawsuits are filed about ethnic preferences than about legacies or athletic recruitment.)

It is also critical to keep in mind that inequality may exist (or even become more pronounced) after discriminatory practices are eliminated. Again, this is because unequal possession of valued characteristics (e.g., education, athleticism) produces its own forms of distinction. Simply because we do not label such differences and their subsequent differential rewards as discriminatory does not make the resulting social structure any less unequal. In some cases, historical legacies of discrimination in one field (say military service) may produce an overrepresentation of a group in another socioeconomic area (e.g., commerce). Social and political changes altering the differential rewards associated with one or the other area could lead to a reversal of group fortune. The diasporic commercial elites of Chinese, Bengalis, Lebanese, and Jews are classic examples. Such populations are often in turn accused of discriminatory policies against the majority and then subject to new forms of exclusion, exile, or violence.

Such dilemmas pose a difficult challenge to the liberal ideology of much of globalization. One of the most explicit ideological foundations of globalization is the celebration of individual aspiration and achievement. For such reasons, globalizing forces are usually arrayed against customs and practices that result in discrimination. But cheerleaders for the greater freedom brought about by the global meritocracy need to be cautious. There is first the obvious danger of groups using the supposedly bias-free criteria to merely perpetuate or strengthen unequal access. This does not have to necessarily involve opportunistic duplicity; discrimination may be unconscious

or more institutionalized. Perhaps more troubling is that as globalization increases the relative rewards of performance, it may produce greater barriers and broaden social gulfs. Thus, taking down the barriers that prevent individual merit from its just rewards may be a good in and of itself, but it is not a panacea for the ongoing problems of inequality. It is important to face the possibility that because of such trends, inequality might actually increase in a society, even after (or even because) of the elimination of discriminatory practices. Should we be more comfortable with higher Gini indices simply because they are based on forms of distinction we find more palatable than skin color or ethnic heritage?

The relationship between discrimination and unequal outcomes should therefore be understood in the appropriate geographical and historical context. Each society tends to see its particular version of discrimination as universal and obvious, but if we are to draw any generalizable conclusions we must expand the set of cases to include the broad variety of social relations and practices that may be observed. The simple collection of cases will not do as methods will differ and often will be designed for particular national circumstances. Our task in this book is to establish a base with which we can begin comparing different forms of discrimination across the world. Do humans distinguish in different ways or merely in the definition of salient characteristics? Are these systemic forms of bias reeling in the face of globalization? How do they play out in and interact with new global market logics?

Readers will no doubt find many areas that we have neglected. Anti-Semitism is an obvious example, as is, sadly, the treatment of Arabs in contemporary Israel. The history and contemporary experience of the Roma in Europe also deserve much more attention. Ethnic distinctions in sub-Saharan Africa and religious differences in the Middle East have also produced complex systems of exclusion and discrimination. Closer to home, the barriers faced by the descendants of the pre-Columbian populations have already seen much study and again deserve to be better integrated into the broader literature on discrimination. As the world becomes more closely linked and as the demographic changes in these countries continue, the percentage of immigrants in the richer societies will no doubt increase, as well as the social problem of managing relations between new arrivals and "natives." At the very least, we hope that this volume will encourage more comparative work in these and other areas.

In the next section, I begin with a broad view of how globalization and discrimination may be interconnected. I then move to a discussion on how we could ever measure something as particularistic as discrimination in any meaningful comparative way. Following this introductory material I then move to a summary of the major cases. This is followed by a discussion of what general principles we may gather from the studies.

FINDINGS

How much does globalization matter in discrimination? Weisskopf, in chapter 2, reminds us that this not the first time the world has been globalized, and the previous two global epochs were largely disastrous for non-Europeans. The experience of those earlier eras should, if nothing else, make us question any semifunctionalist accounts of global hierarchy by simple recourse to claims that the "West is the best." The fact that global capitalism was born in such violence should also challenge our expectations that global interconnections consist solely of trucking and bartering. Weisskopf analyzes both how globalization may affect discrimination and how it will help or hinder perhaps the best-known policy solution to current and historical discrimination, affirmative action. He answers this question by separating these effects into those in the center and those in the periphery.

In the center, Weisskopf notes the oft-cited cost of globalization to low-skilled workers now competing either domestically or internationally with previously peripheral labor. This fosters discrimination in two forms: indirectly by the fact that when the lower income levels are disproportionably filled by minority ethnics in the center countries, the globalization of labor hurts a specific racial group disproportionably. More directly, and as we have seen in the past few years of nativist backlash, it creates demands for anti-immigrant policies and taints anyone suspected of being nonnative. He finds that globalization should not deter affirmative action policies meant to abet these consequences. However, to the extent that globalization leads to those on the bottom being perceived as invaders, it will reduce support for any positive state action to ameliorate their conditions.

On the periphery, Weisskopf notes that the growth of capitalist institutions and ideas will tend to reduce "the salience of ethnicity-based discrimination while giving rise to other forms of inequality." From the point of view of discrimination (as opposed to a broader social inequity), the question becomes whether members of a particular ethnic group are systematically prevented from accessing the skills or contacts necessary to succeed in the brave new globalized world. If elite universities remain closed to members of group X, or if they find their access to tourism-related jobs obstructed, or if they are unable to immigrate with the same ease (thereby reducing the aggregate remittances sent home to their base ethnic group), then the process of globalization will not represent an exit strategy, but yet another circle of exclusion.[2]

What I find particularly useful about Weisskopf's chapter is that it demonstrates that the effects of globalization on the racial dynamics of a society are not determined solely by international flows, but in how these interact

with domestic institutions. Countries are therefore not doomed or blessed to suffer or benefit from globalization dynamics, but can help determine how these will penetrate their societies.

In order to determine the relationship between discrimination and globalization, we need a metric. Most would agree that discrimination exists, that we can sometimes recognize it (often in or against ourselves) and that it makes a difference in a variety of life outcomes. The point is, how much of a difference? How much salience should we give to deeply embedded inequities? For every person believing that discrimination has determined an important aspect of his life, there is arguably another who minimizes the consequences and thinks of most discrimination as nothing more than bad manners or bad taste. Obviously these two opposing views tend to be highly correlated with the relevant category of the observer: the dominant are often unaware of the nature of their dominance. Arriving at an agreed-on form of counting and defining behavior is always important in policy debates, but perhaps nowhere as critical as in the study of discrimination. This is even more critical when one is trying to do comparisons across cases, as we hope this volume will encourage others to do. So, if we are to understand the nature and consequences of racism in the United States, Brazil, and South Africa, then coming up with a single common measure and a means to achieve has been the first step.

Chapter 3 provides a base for that discussion. In it, Devah Pager analyzes the various difficulties associated with measuring discrimination. First, there is the problem with the point of view of the victim. Some may feel that random acts are actually part of a systemic pattern of exclusion, while others may have so internalized prejudice as to be unaware of discrimination. When is it perfectly rational for a member of a categorized group to be paranoid? Similarly, the views of those doing the discriminating are also difficult to measure. Efforts to create a politically correct society may distort the information respondents provide, or they may be blissfully unaware of the cognitive connections in their minds. Bias against a particular group shades into prejudice against certain associated characteristics. Moreover, any measurement of perceptions still leaves the question of linking this to behavior and social consequences.

One way of remedying this is to bypass the social interaction altogether and focus on the statistical evidence of over- or underrepresentation of a group in a desired status. Thus, consistent underrepresentation in leadership positions across a broad array of institutions would seem to indicate some measure of discrimination. Yet here it is often difficult to control for other variables that may better explain the relationship between identity and attainment. This is particularly important for discussions of globalization when access to a dominant language, a critical skill, or a valued certificate

both increases the likelihood of success in a globalized world and is highly correlated with membership in a certain category. The problem for comparative work here is that few countries outside of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have the databases necessary to complete this kind of work. Fortunately, as we see in the sections on India, Brazil, and South Africa, this does not apply to arguably the most interesting cases.

A very different methodological turn takes us away from the social reality and emphasizes laboratory experiments. These are particularly well suited for analyzing the psychological or microlevels of discrimination: for example, how we process identity signals and then decide to act or not act on them. Precisely because of their artificial nature, such studies may be ideally suited to cross-national comparison as the specific conditions can be easily controlled or explicitly adjusted to meet local standards. Such an effort might allow us to define a universal model of discrimination.

Pager is most excited by methods that take insights from all of the above and seek to measure the extent of discrimination in specific exchanges. Audit studies essentially create parallel sets of individuals, divided by some form of identity marker but identical in every other possible way. These groups are then sent into social situations where the response to these differences can be easily gauged, callbacks from real estate or employment ads being the most common. The results in the United States have demonstrated much higher levels of discrimination against African Americans, for example, than even many experts would have guessed. The appeal of this method for comparative work is obvious and some of the chapters on India demonstrate its potential. The drawbacks for comparative work, however, are significant. First, there is the serious, if plebian, constraint of money; these studies cost a great deal and such resources are not often available to local scholars in the relevant countries. Second, given the variance in the national processes of finding a home, a school, or a job, there are clear limits on how much a single methodological design can be applied across borders. Where jobs are routinely not advertised, for example, such methods will obviously be of more limited utility. The key here seems to be to very explicitly deal with these issues on a case-by-case basis.

Our identifying obvious and critical arenas of discrimination determined the selection of case studies. The cases of Brazil and South Africa seemed particularly fruitful as they involved large multiracial democracies only recently beginning to grapple with the historical legacies of massive systemic discrimination. We considered including chapters on the United States, but soon realized that size limitations would make it impossible to provide even an uneven reflection of the scholarly work in that area. Many of the methodologies used in the studies, will, however, be quite familiar to

students of race in America. The sheer size of the exclusionary system in India and the relative lack of work on it by Western academics made the inclusion of these chapters also obvious. The Japan chapters originated in our interest in focusing on gender exclusion in an otherwise fairly homogenous society, one that has led the world in the globalization of its economy. Each of these cases had something to teach us, but in surprising ways, they told similar stories.

Especially in the contemporary era, discrimination is often less based on automatic assignment of lower status to a particular identity than on a perceived correlation between that identity and some disagreeable or disapproved behavior. Thus, it is no longer considered legitimate to say that "People X should be on the bottom," but more acceptable to say, "People X are lazy and don't work, so of course they are on the bottom." In many of the case studies, we find evidence of gatekeepers explicitly rejecting traditional prejudices while legitimating their discriminatory practices by references to the expected behavior of the relevant group. This process is particularly important in South Africa, where previously sanctioned distinctions are now taboo, yet where mobility has been frustratingly slow.

Chapter 4 explores how South African respondents distinguish between what we might call the deserving and undeserving poor. Using a series of vignettes in a survey instrument, Jeremy Seekings first finds that respondents make an important overall distinction between the unfortunate who should be helped (the sick or those providing care) as opposed to those who do not deserve any such assistance (e.g., drinkers). In itself this is an important finding as it indicates that efforts to fight against discrimination must first deal with often vague notions of worth, disadvantage, and justification. Over and above detailing discrimination, policies must also meet some sense of deservedness.

In many of the vignettes, Seekings's team provides information on the race of the subject in question. Based on this data, Seekings establishes several key points: African respondents seem most willing to accept the deserving status of someone in dire circumstances while whites were the least. Yet when asked how much money someone would receive, whites were the most generous. All of the racial categories were least likely to define a white subject in dire circumstances as deserving. Overall, however, Seekings finds that neither African nor white respondents significantly discriminate against any group in their response to vignettes.

When the respondents are asked about specific policies (as opposed to abstract grants of money), the pattern becomes more complicated. Specific questions regarding affirmative action elicit much more negative responses from both colored and white respondents. This finding leaves in question whether a rejection of such policies has to do with a racialized judgment or

with ideological opposition. This chapter again underlines the importance of convincing a population of the legitimacy of a historical claim to having being discriminated against.

Chapter 5 further explores the interaction between race and behavioral expectations. Justine Burns reports results from two experiments with college and high school students in South Africa. In the first "dictator game," respondents are given an endowment of money and asked how much they would like to give to another participant. In the control cases, the race of the possible recipient is hidden. In others it is indicated by either surname or a photograph. In a second variant of such games, this time with a strategic element added, the initial gift is tripled and the recipient then asked how much she would like to give back to the initiating respondent. If the first set of games measures some element of generosity or altruism, the second emphasizes strategic trust.

The results indicate that both socioeconomic context and racial identity matter. In all settings black initiators give away less money than their white counterparts. This reflects the much lower economic resources common in the black community (and thus the relative higher value of each monetary unit). This is an important finding as it indicates that those on the bottom of a social ladder may be less generous to their counterparts, even if these share a common identity. This is not an indication of racially defined meanness but a reflection of the value of a rand for different classes. Both races shared a set of expectations regarding black behavior with consistent reports of lower expected gifts from black recipients. The racial identity of the recipient does not appear to be significant in the simpler altruistic game. While there is a bias toward those with the same identity (e.g., white to white or black to black), it is only in the strategic game that this bias becomes important. Thus, while members of a multiracial society may be as generous to a member of a different group as to one of their own, the level of trust in outsiders is significantly lower.

The evidence presented in Michael Cosser's chapter indicates that it will take much longer than many would suspect to dismantle the legacies of a system such as apartheid. There remains a huge gap in educational participation across the races, almost exactly reflecting the status of the various groups under the pre-1994 regime. Thus whites are vastly overrepresented not only in higher education and in the locales with most prestige, while blacks are vastly underrepresented in both, with coloreds and Indian Asians somewhere in between.

There is room for hope, however, as the more recent enrollment figures are significantly better in terms of race than their equivalents in 2001. While whites are still vastly overrepresented (with a quarter of higher education enrollments as opposed to less than 7% of the relevant age group nationally)

and again blacks are underrepresented (58–83% respectively), this is better than in 2001 and a vast improvement over 1993 when blacks only accounted for 9% of higher education enrollment.

That the difference in racial enrollment can continue despite the transition to majority rule, with the explicit encouragement of black university education by practically all relevant institutions, and within an economy globalized enough to make it clear that education is the path to take, indicates how entrenched the legacies of discrimination may be. In order to explore the reasons for this continuity, Cosser analyzes the class background of participants in a survey of 12th graders (unfortunately, we appear not to have data on the class composition of university cohorts). The vast majority of black South Africans in this age cohort (76.3%) come from low socioeconomic status (SES) families while only 10.3% of whites do so (and nearly half come from high-SES households). (These figures are consistent with the concentration of whites in rich households, blacks in poor ones, and coloreds throughout the income spectrum, as found by Seekings in his study of Cape Town.) Yet again, there is some hope as these numbers represent a significant improvement over 2001 (not to speak of 1993), and by 2006 nearly 10% of black students in 12th grade came from high-SES households.

For many years, Brazil was said to represent a remarkable model of racial democracy. While no one denied the vast inequalities of the country (it is arguably the most unequal society on earth), a distinguished list of Brazilian and foreign observers remarked that racial discrimination was not significant in Brazil and that social barriers were largely along regional and class lines. Beginning in the 1960s, this benign image was consistently challenged by increasingly sophisticated studies of Brazilian reality, and the role of race came to be more and more appreciated. The real question became not so much whether there was racial prejudice in Brazil (there was—even if in a different form than that found in the United States or South Africa), but what the relative roles of race and class were in determining Brazilian social hierarchy.

Chapter 7 provides a systemic analysis of the composition of inequality in Brazil and demonstrates that racial discrimination still pervades the society, but in surprising ways and places. For the purposes of this book, Costa Ribeiro accurately focuses not just on the comparative social position of different groups (evidence of inequity), but also on the barriers to mobility (more related to discrimination per se). He finds that discrimination needs to be contextualized by level; that depending on what social level gatekeepers are providing access to, their proclivities or abilities to hinder passage will be quite different. This is a vital observation in and of itself since its shifts the question from whether discrimination exists to a much more

empirically analyzable question of where it exists and specifically against whom.

In his first set of findings, Costa Ribeiro shows that racial discrimination is much more relevant the higher one climbs in the social ladder. This goes against the far too easily adopted stereotypes of discrimination as practiced by the poor and ignorant, while the rich and educated behave in cosmopolitan ways. Costa Ribeiro demonstrates that in the first rungs of the occupational ladder, race does not matter, controlling for parents' class background. In the higher levels, however, whites have a much higher chance of being able to pass on their status generationally while nonwhites have a lower chance of climbing and a higher chance of falling. In other words, for whites, a parent's class position can be much more of a guarantee for the progeny. For nonwhites, a higher class position is much less easily inherited.

The next stage of Costa Ribeiro's analysis concerns access to education. It is now well established that in a globalized world, access to education is the key to social position. By analyzing the probabilities of obtaining the next educational level within the ranks of the Brazilian educational system, Costa Ribeiro demonstrates that class has a major effect. One optimistic sign is that the effect of class decreases as we progress up the educational pyramid. That is, once children achieve a certain level of education, the probability of their being able to escape their parents' class position increases. Less happily, the effect of race functions in the opposite direction. As one climbs the educational ladder, race appears to become more and more of a factor, again controlling for class origins.

This pattern becomes even clearer when Costa Ribeiro combines the various models and seeks to predict class position based on both class origin and educational position. For those in the lower part of the occupational and class structure, the racial differences appear to be nil. That is, at the bottom, Brazil is relatively democratic racially. But, as the social funnel becomes smaller, race becomes increasingly salient. The well-educated children of the black professional class will face racial discrimination. While this finding goes against certain widely held prejudices regarding racial attitudes among the working class, it makes a great deal of sense. As one climbs up the labor market the level of discretion and the importance of nonformal selectivity increases. Thus the opportunity to close access based on particularistic identity preferences also increases.

If Brazil has often been sold as a racial democracy, Japan enjoys fame for its social equity. Yet the stereotypical image of working life in Japan has a male face, the ubiquitous salary man. When women do appear to be working, they tend to be the equally ubiquitous hostesses at apparently every hotel lobby or large department store. Chapters 8 and 9, by Kimura and

Miyoshi, give us a much deeper understanding of the barriers faced by female workers in Japan.

Both Kimura and Miyoshi analyze the effect of entry level on subsequent wages. Kimura begins by providing an optimistic view of the male-female income gap from 1965 to 2000. As we would expect, given the increasing globalization of the economy, the increasing pressure on performance, the demographic decline, and the internal and external pressures to address gender inequity, the gap shrinks significantly across this time period and is consistently smaller for younger workers. A Japanese woman younger than age 30 in 2000 could expect to make roughly 80% that of a male equivalent—not equal, but certainly an improvement on the less than half made by her older female counterparts or in 1965. Kimura argues that the declining gap has largely to do with the increasing female participation in higher education. This would fit well with the standard economistic reading of globalization, as norms make exclusion of women even more difficult, and education provides a greater net benefit.

Much less optimistic is the analysis of the "marriage bar" involving discrimination among employers against married women. While the number of married women working outside the home has increased since 1965, there remains a huge gap in labor force participation between married and unmarried women. According to Kimura, the discrimination is ensconced in employers' concerns that female married employees cannot or will not devote the same energy to their careers, particularly after childbirth. This leads them to provide fewer opportunities for promotion or job enhancement, thus leading to some voluntary dropout from the labor market by women. Interestingly, Kimura argues against analyses that see gender stereotypes as leading to internalization of values, but believes that women want the same opportunities and believe that they are capable of meeting these challenges.

Koyo Miyoshi seeks to explore gender inequities by analyzing wage differentials. He does so by taking into account not only remuneration, but also participation in the more regularized work force. He begins by confirming the widely held belief that women in Japan do suffer from a larger wage gap than in other OECD nations (67% of male salaries as opposed to 79% in the United States).

Miyoshi seeks to disaggregate this gap by first looking at the likelihood of participating in the regular workforce (full-time and long service). Using household survey data, he finds that male workers are much more likely to be working as regulars and to have had previous experience as such. Not surprisingly, this is associated with an astounding gap in university education (40.8% for males as compared to 14.8% for females). As in most discriminatory institutions, the effect of these biases is additive: previous

experience as a regular worker increases the likelihood of having such a position and seniority in such jobs is also positively correlated with currently holding them. The returns on human resource characteristics are also biased as experience and seniority in the regular sector (associated with males) produces more income, but the same in the irregular labor force has little effect. Even when possessing the same set of educational and professional experiences, females seem to enjoy much less of a human resource benefit than their male counterparts. The resulting analysis leads to the inevitable conclusion that there are significant wage differences between men and women that cannot be explained by differences in the professionally relevant characteristics of the individuals.

The persistence of such gender inequality in Japan (arguably the first country to demonstrate the economic benefits of globalizing the economy) would indicate that economic modernization in and of itself does not necessarily lead to significant challenges to traditional discrimination. Social life can consistently be bifurcated into a modern or cosmopolitan sphere and one in which all barriers retain their salience. This is perhaps best illustrated by Miyoshi's findings regarding the motivation to enter the labor force. For women, this appears to be closely linked to the number and age of children and the income of the spouse (both negatively related to likelihood of participating in the labor force). For men, neither factor seems to matter. In short, women in Japan are only allowed to work when they can (no young children) or when they have to (low household income).

The caste system is perhaps the one thing that most people know about the Indian subcontinent. This partly reflects the exoticized nature of the hierarchies, and partly the very clear and real inequities that it produces. In my observation, people who much more readily accept similar gulfs in human well-being across and within societies appear particularly horrified with the example of caste barriers. This is partly a product of "Orientalist" views of India and its social divisions, but also reflects the sheer numbers involved: nearly 200 million Dalits and perhaps over half a billion total lower castes. Caste is perhaps the largest functioning national scheme of systemic exclusion by identity on the planet (other than gender).

Despite the huge literature on the caste system and the well-known discrimination it produces, we possesses relatively little empirical data on how much caste matters in India. The last four chapters are part of an ongoing collaboration between a group of American scholars seeking new arenas in which to use and explore their methodologies and Indian counterparts looking to more exactly document the inequities they know are there. In part because the costs of the caste system are so obvious in many settings, especially rural ones, these authors sought to focus on caste in those areas of Indian life where it is supposed to matter the least. Celebratory stories of

globalization's impact on Indian poverty and society have become quite common in the past decade.[3] These scholars sought to measure the impact of caste in precisely the space where modernization is supposed to render it irrelevant: the educational and corporate heights of the formal sector in India.

That education in and of itself is not an automatic leveler of the playing field is the conclusion reached by Newman and Deshpande in their replication of the pioneering study made by Deirdre Royster (2003) in the United States. Rather than focusing on statistical methods or field studies, chapter 10 follows 172 graduates or soon-to-be graduates of some of India's most prestigious universities as they enter the job market. Despite some differences in the skills with which they entered university (reflecting historical patterns of discrimination and differential familial resources), the qualifications possessed by the two categories of caste (essentially reflecting Dalits vs. non-Dalits) do not explain the very different postgraduate experiences.

First, Dalit students expect much less. They expect to make less money and have less prestigious jobs, and do not expect to be hired in the generally more dynamic and remunerative private sector. This form of employment autocensure would in itself cause a significant difference in the professional outcomes of the two groups even in the absence of discrimination. But accounts of job interviews clearly demonstrate that these students are facing a considerable barrier of expectations having to do with family background and the like. Yet students from the more advantaged category do not see that they may enjoy advantages and, in fact, consider that the system is rigged in favor of the lower castes. While this early stage of the study does not allow an analysis of job outcomes, all indications are that the Indian environment is replicating that found in the United States by Royster and others. Not only does the "in" group enjoy significant advantages, but also rhetoric of individual meritocracy has developed that allows the privileged to see any efforts to level the playing field as illegitimate.

The expectation that the job market will present significant barriers to graduates with identity markers of "out" groups is verified in chapter 11, by Newman and Jodhka. Based on interviews with 25 individuals with significant hiring power in successful Indian private firms, these authors find a set of attitudes explicitly claiming to be bias free, but also supporting discriminatory judgments.

All of the interviewees expressed explicit commitments to a meritocratic hiring system and all expressed their disdain for what they perceived as outdated norms of favoritism and prejudice. To be modern is to hire by merit. But as observed in a variety of other arenas, the definitions of merit are hardly socially neutral.

The social construction of merit is perhaps clearest in the employers' discussion of the importance of family background. From their more specific

comments, it is clear that these gatekeepers are looking to hire people who come from situations similar to their own. Interestingly, they express the well-established bias against both ends of the social hierarchy, claiming that neither the very poor nor the very rich will fit into their firms. These same biases are also expressed in terms of regional preferences with various locales associated with the relevant values sought by the firm.

Despite holding these views, the employers are practically unanimous in their rejection of any affirmative action policies that, they argue, will not only be unjust but will also hinder Indian development. In the powerful closed circle of their meritocratic ideology, they see their standards as not only fair but also efficient, while those imposed by the state are neither.

In a pioneering replication of the audit studies discussed in chapter 3, Attewell and Thorat seek the document the extent to which signals of membership in a religious minority or a Dalit group cost potential job applicants. By replicating professional and educational experiences, but differentiating some identity signal, such studies seek to control for any and all of the endowment characteristics that may reflect historical barriers rather than contemporary discrimination. These authors discuss that the type of discrimination they are studying does not have to be accompanied by the Indian version of stereotypical racialist perceptions and behaviors, but can be embedded in more subtle cultural hierarchies.

The authors focus on a search for employees that already neglects critical forms of discrimination. By looking at only open employment notices, the authors are excluding the arguably much more exclusive hiring practices that go on behind public view. The results of these experiments have already been the subject of considerable media and political attention in India. When applying for these professional jobs, applicants with a Dalit name had .67 of the odds of an equivalently qualified applicant with a high-caste Hindu name. For those with a Muslim name, the figure was .33. Perhaps even more astoundingly, for jobs that nominally required post-BA degrees, applicants with high-caste names, but without such qualifications, had the same chance of contact as those with Dalit names but with advanced degrees.[4]

Chapter 13, by Attewell and Madheswaran, demonstrates the effect of all of these discriminatory practices by providing a statistical bird's-eye view of the wage hierarchy in what they call liberal India. They find that, as expected, education pays a significant premium and that, over time, the return on ever-higher qualifications has increased. Predictably this has produced more inequality across classes in India. But this is not coming at the expense of more traditional forms of discrimination: in a fascinating if depressing finding, they show that returns on education vary by caste and that those on the bottom of the hierarchy benefit less from their educational investment than those above.

They then break down the data further to establish how much of the caste-based gap has to do with educational attainment (largely reflecting historical discrimination) and how much can only be explained by contemporary exclusion. Operating through a series of mechanisms (including occupational segregation), they find that simple discrimination against lower castes accounts for 30% of the wage gap (and again, this is in the formal urban sector, not in the rural villages where caste penalties are expressed in even more ferocious terms). Of greater concern to those who see the globalization of the capitalist ethic as bringing greater equity, the wage gap is much greater in the private sector than in the public one where some affirmative action policies have existed since Independence.

GLOBAL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION

The analyses of discrimination in these chapters indicate that the patterns of exclusion may be more universal than we might first believe. Certainly the markers and the categories are different from society to society. But all the cases seem to share the same mechanisms: marking off a group as unable to perform (at best) or inhuman (at worst). These attributes are often expressed in the same breath as protestations wishing it were another way and claims not to be biased. Meritocratic language has been globalized, but the underlying reality remains the same.

What are the underlying patterns?

The first and most obvious is a form of discrimination that requires little sociological analysis (at least as a social phenomenon): simple refusal to allow those possessing a certain characteristic to have access to a position or an opportunity. In much of the world the explicit ideology that used to be openly expressed against members of the disadvantaged group has disappeared, except in some marginal cases. But the real effects of such sentiments are still clearly visible. Among the cases studied in this volume, the best evidence seems to come from the studies by Attewell, Thorat, and Madheswaran. Whether as measured by the differential return to education across castes or the astounding results of the job audit study, it is clear that Dalits, Muslims, and members of lower castes still confront the age-old challenges of signs that stipulate "none of you wanted here."

A more subtle form of discrimination does not operate on the exclusion of categorical qualities, but rather ascribes qualities to members of a certain group and then denies them access on the basis of these supposed negative characteristics. Such practices claim to judge individuals on the "content of their character" but then assume certain content based on external signals. An obvious example is found in the work of Newman, Deshpande, and

Jodhka where employers speak of the problems with the family background of lower caste applicants that would supposedly interfere with their professional effectiveness. Issues of "deservedness" among the poor or of trust among coworkers, as discussed in chapters 4 and 5, are also critical in this regard. Assumptions of likely actions (even if not associated with a character issue) hamper groups such as women, whose devotion to the employer may be questioned (chapter 8). These kinds of expectations can easily be internalized and in the case studies we see several examples of the relevant populations asking for and expecting less than their due.

The most significant form of discrimination found in the cases involves denial of access to critical gateways. In both chapters 8 and 9, for example, we see that women find their access to the first step in remunerative employment effectively blocked. This then facilitates later blockage as these women of course do not subsequently possess the skills, training, or experience to handle the best jobs. In chapters 6 and 7 we find that some of this denial of access is of course a historical legacy. But at least in the case of Brazil, we also note that even when provided with some of the tools necessary to succeed by their relatively successful parents, children and young adults of color will find significant obstacles.

Despite these patterns, the cases reveal an apparently universal aversion to affirmative action policies by those whose privileged position is being challenged. Some of this has to do with a simple defense of self-interest. Some stems from a continued refusal to accept that past (and current) practices deserve some policy response. The most complex responses use the very language of meritocracy to deny the possibility of any active policy intervention in education and employment. This latter response makes rigorous work on discrimination ever more important as only with clear evidence of the results of discrimination can policies to remedy it be defended politically.

Perhaps the most important lesson from comparing all of these papers is that education is the new means by which the world creates social hierarchies. Access to schooling is obviously critical, not just because in any case education is closely tied to future SES, but also because all experts recognize that globalization is making education the new standard for the definition of inequality. If one finds, for example, that particular groups are unable to lay their hands on this "currency of the global realm," then there is little chance that the democratizing forces of globalization can play a positive role and a very good chance that they will simply confirm and support more of the same.

In this way, education may be seen as the new form of landed property. To an extent, but one not analyzed in these chapters, education may even "whiten." This would be consistent with claims for defenders of globaliza-

tion that the liberalization of the global economy is democratizing inequality and getting rid of traditional categories. There remains the interesting question of whether skill-defined class fissures will actually reduce levels of inequality from those maintained by ethnic or racial barriers. But the studies also clearly demonstrate that the educational world is far from flat and that traditional distinctions are being supported through privileged access to education. Whether in South Africa, Brazil, Japan, or India, access to education is highly correlated with membership in previously privileged categories.

All of the studies were carried out at the apex of the latest globalizing boom. Given the findings in fairly positive settings, we fully expect that the crisis that began in 2007 will have exacerbated the discriminatory policies discussed in this book. We hope that the models serve as a guide for continuing work that, unfortunately, is ever more likely to remain salient.

Fortunately for the future of comparative studies of these phenomena, the studies reveal that while requiring a great deal of local sensitivity, methodologies can be carried across borders. The data sets increasingly exist outside of the OECD, allowing for sophisticated statistical techniques. Local colleagues can design the signaling marks needed for audit studies. Experiments can be carried out in locales far removed from American psychology laboratories. The editors hope that this volume will encourage the geographical and methodological expansion of scholarship on discrimination and that such comparative work will provide new clues for policies needed to ameliorate practices of exclusion.

Notes

1. But the methodological finer points of measurement receive a great deal of attention.

2. The last two processes are very much in play in Cuba, for example. The majority black population is underrepresented in both the tourist industry and in the exile community, thereby creating a form of dollar apartheid.

3. This is not to deny these stories. Indian participants in the project are themselves proof of the changes. The question is not whether anything has changed, but how much and how fast.

4. This eerily parallels findings in the United States that white men with prison records fared as well as black men without them in the market for low-skill jobs.